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JOINING IN, BLOWING THE WHISTLE, OR INTERVENING: EXAMINING THE EFFECTS 
OF SEVERITY AND ORGANIZATIONAL IDENTIFICATION ON FRATERNITY/
SORORITY MEMBERS’ RESPONSES TO HAZING
BRIAN K. RICHARDSON, uNIvERSITY OF NORTH TExAS, STEvE RAINS, uNIvERSITY OF 
ARIZONA, AND CAMILLE HALL-ORTEGA, uNIvERSITY OF TExAS AT AuSTIN
Hazing, a form of organizational wrongdoing endemic to fraternities and sororities, 
persists on college campuses, often resulting in deleterious outcomes. To better understand 
organizational members’ responses to hazing, we considered the influence of members’ 
organizational identification and the severity of the hazing situation on three response 
options: participating, whistle-blowing, and intervening. Members of fraternities and 
sororities (N = 243) were randomly assigned to read one scenario in which hazing severity 
was manipulated and then asked to complete a questionnaire containing measures of 
organizational identification and hazing response options. Hazing severity influenced two 
of the three outcomes. As the hazing event became more severe, willingness to participate 
decreased and motivation to blow the whistle increased. Hazing severity also moderated 
relationships between organizational identification and the three response options. When 
severity was low, organizational identification was positively associated with willingness 
to participate and negatively associated with intentions to whistle-blow and motivation to 
stop the activity. The results are discussed in terms of reducing hazing through education, 
training, and culture change. 
Hazing is “any humiliating or dangerous activity 
expected of you to join a group, regardless of your 
willingness to participate” (Hoover, 1999, p. 8); 
hazing activities range from innocuous demands 
or requests of new members to extreme acts 
of aggression (Etzel, Watson, Visek, & Maniar, 
2006). Hazing has endured on college campuses, 
often resulting in physical, psychological, and 
emotional abuse for victims (McCreary, Bray, 
Thoma, 2016; Montague, Zohra, Love, & 
McGee, 2008; Nuwer, 2018). Allan and Madden 
(2008) found that 55% of college students 
participating in university organizations have 
experienced hazing. Hazing is particularly 
endemic to fraternities and sororities, many of 
which are historically rooted in such traditions 
(Owen, Burke, & Vichesky, 2008). Indeed, 39 
fraternity and sorority members were killed 
in hazing incidents from 2009-2019 (Nuwer, 
2019). Despite official, mandated prohibitions 
to end hazing passed by legitimate authorities 
including universities, states, and (inter)national 
fraternity and sorority organizations, hazing and 
the negative consequences associated with it 
persist (Montague et al., 2008). 
Keating et al. (2005) argued hazing generates 
a number of important group-related outcomes, 
including enhanced group dependence, 
belonging, and identity, suggesting that both 
influences to engage in hazing and solutions to 
the fraternity/sorority hazing problem could be 
addressed within the group. However, fraternity/
sorority members’ high identification levels with 
their respective organizations create a significant 
obstacle to stopping hazing as such groups are 
typically very cohesive, which “can cause group 
members to prohibit fellow group members 
and even themselves from expressing sensible 
dissenting points of view” (Palmer, 2013, p. 
16).  Fraternity/sorority members who witness 
hazing may respond in a number of ways. They 
may engage in whistleblowing, by reporting 
what they have seen to someone who may be able 
to put an end to the unethical behavior (Near & 
Miceli, 1995). Whistleblowing is the most widely 
studied response to organizational wrongdoing, a 
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focus which has led to a whistleblowing/silence 
dichotomy that does not consider other responses 
to such behavior (Teo & Casperesz, 2011). This 
near singular focus on whistleblowing has led us 
to ignore other, perhaps more common, ways 
of responding to organizational wrongdoing 
(Knapp, Faley, Ekeberg, & DuBois, 1997). 
Such responses include participating in 
unethical behavior, or engaging in inaction, 
both of which would foster the continuance 
of wrongdoing (McLain & Keenan, 1999). 
Considering the routine occurrence of hazing, 
this form of response is likely commonplace, 
especially among fraternities/sororities with 
favorable attitudes toward hazing (Owen et 
al., 2008). Fraternity/sorority members could 
also attempt to intervene in the hazing in an 
attempt to end it, though this action requires 
them to immediately and visibly oppose group 
norms (Keating et al., 2005). Finally, they 
could attempt indirect forms of bystander 
intervention, e.g. distraction, in order to divert 
the group’s attention away from a hazing activity 
(Oesterle, Orchowski, Moreno, & Berkowitz, 
2018). Individuals witnessing hazing have each of 
these various response options at their disposal 
and the option they choose will perpetuate or 
help end the behavior. 
Ellsworth (2006) proposed future research 
should explore “whether or not students would 
report or seek to intervene in (hazing) activities” 
(p. 57). In order to reduce hazing, we need to 
better understand how fraternity/sorority 
members respond to it, and factors influencing 
their choices. The purpose of this study was to 
examine two such factors, including perceived 
severity and organizational identification. 
Through offering insights about the role of the 
hazing event and group-related factors such 
as organizational identification, the results of 
this project advance our understanding of how 
and why organizational members respond to 
wrongdoing. Findings of this study can also inform 
intervention strategies devised by universities, 
and national and local chapters, that seek to stop 
hazing activities as they are being planned or are 
being carried out. Next, we review the literature 
addressing ways organizational members respond 




Whistleblowing, defined as “the disclosure by 
organization members (former or current) of 
illegal, immoral, or illegitimate practices under 
the control of their employers, to persons or 
organizations that may be able to effect action” 
(Near & Miceli, 1985, p. 4), appears to be the 
most researched response to organizational 
wrongdoing. Henik (2008) described 
whistleblowing as a sequenced, communicative 
act that is carried out over several stages. In 
the first stage, an individual witnesses a trigger 
event, an act of suspected organizational 
wrongdoing. The second stage is marked by the 
individual considering the act to be ‘wrong,’ and 
engaging in a decision-making process about 
how to respond. In the third stage, the individual 
either blows the whistle or remains silent. The 
fourth stage involves the accused organization 
or group reacting to the report. Finally, in the 
fifth and final stage, the whistle-blower considers 
the organization’s responses, which may include 
retaliation, and ponders whether and how to 
proceed. A preponderance of whistleblowing 
research has examined stage two, with a focus on 
factors influencing someone to blow the whistle 
or remain silent, and stage four, addressing what 
factors predict organizational retaliation against 
whistle-blowers (Mesmer-Magus & Viswesvaran, 
2005). Mesmer-Magus and Viswesvaran’s 
(2005) meta-analysis of whistleblowing research 
revealed a number of factors correlated with 
whistleblowing intentions. These factors include 
individual characteristics such as age, role 
responsibility, and ethical judgment; situational 
characteristics, including threat of retaliation and 
supervisor support; and organizational factors, 
such as organizational climate. More recently, 
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scholars have found the type of wrongdoing 
(Somers & Casal, 2011), a team climate, 
having supervisory status (Rothwell & Baldwin, 
2006), and working in a participatory culture 
(Richardson, Wheeless, & Cunningham, 2008) 
influence reporting intentions. 
Because the bulk of previous studies limit 
respondents’ options to either whistle-blow or 
not, questions remain about whether, if given the 
opportunity, respondents might choose another 
response. An emerging criticism of this line of 
research is its reliance on a whistleblowing/
silence dichotomy that ignores alternative 
member responses (Teo & Caspersz, 2011). In 
fact, a number of whistleblowing models and 
studies limit response options to reporting the 
wrongdoing or remaining silent (Henik, 2008; 
Miceli & Near, 1992; Rothwell & Baldwin, 2006; 
Trongmateerut & Sweeney, 2013). For example, 
in their critique of Miceli and Near’s (1992) 
whistleblowing model, Teo and Caspersz (2011) 
argued “Miceli and Near pose the choice for the 
individual as either to whistle-blow (publicly) 
or remain silent. Notably, the authors do not 
explore alternatives other than this public-level 
option of whistleblowing or retreating into the 
private sphere of silence” (p. 238). 
While studies are limited, researchers have 
found that organizational members pursue a 
wide range of bystander intervention behaviors 
upon witnessing wrongdoing including using 
coded language, sarcasm, humor, gossip, 
informally communicating with peers, including 
the alleged wrongdoer, and intervening to end 
the wrongdoing (Orbe & King, 2000; Teo & 
Caspersz, 2011). Intervening is one response 
to organizational wrongdoing that this study 
addresses. Though both whistleblowing and 
intervening are attempts to end wrongdoing, 
they do so in very different ways. By intervening, 
an individual is very publicly and immediately 
attempting to end an act. Thus, they are at 
risk in the moment for going against group 
behavior (Bowes-Sperry & O’Leary-Kelly, 
2005). Whistleblowing is typically done 
after an observed violation; for example, the 
individual reports suspected wrongdoing to an 
official who is typically not on the scene. While 
whistleblowing could ultimately put an end to 
hazing practices, it would allow it to continue in 
the moment. Still, whistleblowing can be done 
in an anonymous or confidential fashion, offering 
the whistleblower protection from retaliation, 
while still bringing attention to wrongdoing. 
While the research cited above expanded 
the response options of witnessed unethical 
behavior, they still neglect the possibility of 
organizational members choosing to participate 
in wrongdoing. Research indicates individuals 
will engage in behaviors that foster organizational 
wrongdoing, particularly in highly competitive 
situations, when they are highly identified with 
the organization, or when following directives 
from legitimate authorities (Bocchiaro, 
Zimbardo, & Van Lange, 2012; Ploeger & Bisel, 
2013; Richardson et al., 2008). Further, McLain 
and Keenan (1999) asserted “many individuals 
respond to the observation of wrongdoing 
by participating,” (p. 264) which suggests 
this option should be considered in studies of 
responses to organizational wrongdoing. To 
summarize, individuals witnessing unethical 
behavior, including hazing, have a number of 
response options at their disposal. The present 
study addresses two response options in 
opposition to hazing, including whistleblowing 
and intervening, and one option, participating, 
that would allow hazing to continue. Next, 
we explore two variables expected to play a 
particularly important role in response options. 
These include organizational identification, 
which is linked to verbally defending an 
organization’s illegitimate practices (Ploeger 
& Bisel, 2013), and severity of wrongdoing, a 
variable consistently linked to whistleblowing 
behaviors (Cassematis & Wortley, 2013).   
Severity of Wrongdoing
One factor expected to influence how 
organizational members respond to wrongdoing 
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is its perceived severity or harmfulness. Severity 
has been operationalized as wrongdoing 
which could physically harm someone or is 
financially costly in nature (Richardson, Wang, 
& Hall, 2012; Miceli & Near, 1985; Singer, 
Mitchell, & Turner, 1998). Researchers have 
found perceived severity has both direct and 
moderating effects on whistleblowing intentions 
(King, 1997; Singer, Mitchell, & Turner, 
1998). More specifically, research generally 
indicates that as perceived severity increases, 
so too do whistleblowing intentions (Mesmer-
Magnus & Viswesvaran, 2005). Related to the 
present study, researchers have examined the 
influence of perceived severity of hazing acts 
on whistleblowing intentions. In their study of 
undergraduate college students, Campo and 
Poulos (2004) found perceived harm to victims 
was the strongest predictor of initiates and group 
members’ willingness to report hazing. Similarly, 
Richardson et al. (2012) found intentions of 
fraternity and sorority members who witnessed 
hazing increased in relation to the perceived 
severity of the wrongdoing. They conceptualized 
severity as physical harm that could affect hazing 
targets. While these studies demonstrate a link 
between severity and whistleblowing intentions, 
other response options were not considered.
Jones (1991) developed the term “moral 
intensity” to capture “the extent of issue-
related moral imperative in a situation” (p. 
372). Dimensions of moral intensity include 
“magnitude of consequences,” or how many 
people could be harmed by an act, “probability 
of effect,” or the likelihood an act will cause 
harm, and “temporal immediacy,” the amount of 
time between an act and the onset of harm to 
others. Jones argued individuals are increasingly 
likely to intervene as situations increase in 
moral intensity. Considering Jones’ arguments 
and other research focused specifically on 
whistleblowing (King, 1997; Mesmer-Magnus 
& Viswesvaran, 2005; Richardson et al., 2012; 
Singer et al., 1998), we would expect hazing acts 
which possess the potential to cause immediate 
and direct harm to many people would foster 
more intervention attempts and less intent to 
participate. Conversely, low severity hazing 
conditions might lead to respondents reporting 
they would participate and be less likely to 
intervene because the potential for the hazing 
target to be physically or psychologically harmed 
is lower. Thus, we offer the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: Hazing severity affects (a) 
willingness to participate, (b) motivation 
to stop, and (c) intention to whistle-blow 
about the activity such that greater levels of 
severity result in decreased participation, 
increased attempts to intervene, and greater 
intentions to engage in whistleblowing.
Organizational Identification
Although characteristics of a hazing event 
such as severity should play an important role in 
determining member responses, within-group 
factors are also likely to be critical in fostering 
or impeding hazing activities. Organizational 
identification, which involves an individual’s 
perception of belongingness or oneness with 
an organization (Mael & Ashforth, 1992), 
might be particularly useful for understanding 
how fraternity/sorority members’ respond to 
witnessing hazing. Organizational identification 
has origins in social identity theory, which posits 
that people classify themselves and others into 
various social categories enabling them to identify 
or locate themselves in the social environment 
(Tajfel & Turner, 1985). This identification 
process leads to a sense of oneness between 
individuals and the particular groups to which 
they are identifying (Mael & Ashforth, 1992). 
Individuals further perceive the group’s fate as 
intertwined with their own fate. Identification 
with the organization seems particularly salient 
for fraternity/sorority members, as they tend 
to possess high levels of attachment to their 
fraternities and sororities (Davis & Myers, 
2012). As Williams and Connaughton (2012) 
argued, values are salient characteristics of social 
organizations such as fraternities and sororities, 
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and identifications are often constructed 
around shared values between organizations 
and their members. Accordingly, organizational 
identification is likely a group-related factor that 
has implications for reporting wrongdoing. 
 Identification as a form of attachment can 
have great benefit for organizations and their 
members. For example, research has noted 
that individuals with higher identification levels 
are less likely to exit the organization (Apker, 
Propp, & Ford, 2009), engaged in more ethical 
behavior (Akaah, 1992) and were more team 
oriented (Croucher, Long, Meredith, Oommen, 
& Steele, 2009). These findings make sense, 
considering “an individual is said to identify 
with an organization when his membership in 
the organization is integrated into his personal 
identity” (Davis & Myers, 2012, p. 195). As 
individuals’ organizational identification levels 
increase, they will become increasingly attached 
to the organization and see things from its 
perspective (Ploeger & Bisel, 2013). However, 
this claim muddies the water with respect to 
communicative responses to organizational 
wrongdoing. Consider the case of organizational 
members who are highly identified with their 
organizations. Upon witnessing unethical 
behavior, their high identification levels may 
cause them to see things from the organization’s 
perspective, join in the wrongdoing, and/or 
allow it to continue. Conversely, upon witnessing 
wrongdoing, they may perceive that stopping it 
or blowing the whistle will ultimately protect 
the organization and restore it to its idealized 
state. 
Research results offer tentative evidence that 
increased levels of organizational identification 
are linked with the former of these options: 
decreased whistleblowing and greater efforts 
to enable wrongdoing. For example, Grube, 
Piliavin, and Turner (2010) studied the influence 
of nurse role identity, or identification with 
one’s profession, and organizational role identity, 
or identification with one’s organization, on 
nurses’ reporting of unsafe practices. They 
found nurse role identity was not predictive of 
reporting by itself, and that organizational role 
identity moderated the relationship between 
nurse role identity and reporting. Specifically, 
while nurses may be highly identified with 
their roles, their attachment to their employing 
organizations seems to take precedence as they 
consider whether to report unsafe practices. 
This conclusion led Grube et al. (2010) to 
suggest “the highest probability of reporting 
occurs when organizational role identity is low 
and nurse role identity is low” (p. 161); so, lower 
organizational identification leads to reporting 
unethical behavior. In fact, the nurses may blow 
the whistle in order to harm the organization 
which they do not identity. Ploeger and Bisel 
(2013) found that highly identified members will 
defend their organizations against allegations of 
wrongdoing more intensely and more frequently 
than their less identified counterparts. Taken 
together, these findings suggest that, as 
organizational identification increases, attempts 
to stop unethical behavior should decrease. We 
offer the following hypotheses to test this notion:
Hypothesis 2: Organizational identification 
is associated with (a) willingness to 
participate, (b) motivation to stop, and 
(c) intention to whistle-blow about 
hazing activity such that as organizational 
identification increases, participation 
increases, and intervention and 
whistleblowing decrease.
Finally, we sought to understand how hazing 
severity affected the various response options 
differently depending upon the participant’s 
level of organizational identification with their 
fraternity/sorority. We expected that level 
of severity would moderate the relationship 
between organizational identification and 
response options. When hazing is severe, there 
should be no relationship between organizational 
identification and the three response options. 
Because the magnitude of consequences, 
proximity, and immediacy are great, individuals 
will take ethical action regardless of their 
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organizational identification level. Conversely, 
when the hazing severity is low or moderate, 
organizational identification will be positively 
associated with participation and negatively 
associated with whistleblowing or attempts 
to stop the activity. If the harm to targets is 
either moderate or mild in terms of severity 
(Richardson et al., 2012), then the desire to be 
considered a “good” organizational member will 
override one’s motivation to behave ethically. 
These possibilities are detailed in the following 
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: Hazing severity moderates 
the relationships between organizational 
identification and (a) willingness to 
participate (b) motivation to stop, and (c) 
whistleblowing intentions. Organizational 
identification is positively associated with 
participation and negatively associated with 
intervention intentions and whistleblowing 
when the level of hazing severity is low and 
moderate; when hazing severity is high, 
the relationships between organizational 
identification and the three outcome 




A total of 243 fraternity and sorority 
member participated in the study. In order to 
maintain consistency in the type of respondents 
composing our sample, we only recruited 
members of fraternities/sororities affiliated 
with the Collegiate Panhellenic Council, 
Multicultural Greek Council, Interfraternity 
Council, and National Pan-Hellenic Council, 
rather than those belonging to service or 
academic organizations. Participants were 
recruited from two large, public universities 
in the southwestern United States. Students 
in undergraduate communication courses 
completed the survey if they were in a sorority 
or fraternity; if they were not in a fraternity 
or sorority, they recruited such individuals 
to complete the survey in exchange for extra 
credit. In order to recruit a participant, they 
provided the student’s name and email address. 
We then sent the surveys to those respective 
addresses. Seventy-two participants were from 
University A and 171 were from University B. 
The mean age of participants was 20.6 years 
(SD = 1.41), and participants were more likely 
to be female (61.7%). Two-hundred and one 
participants described their race as Caucasian, 
10 as Latina/Latino, 10 as African American, 12 
as Asian American, five as Other, and five did not 
indicate their race. Participants reported being 
a member of their current fraternity or sorority 
for a mean of 3.9 semesters (SD = 2.12).
Design and Procedure
Hazing severity (low/moderate/high) was 
the single manipulated variable in this study. 
Participants were randomly assigned to read 
one scenario in which hazing severity was 
manipulated and then asked to complete the 
study questionnaire. At the conclusion of the 
study, participants were given information 
about local resources that could help with any 
questions or concerns they had about hazing on 
their campus.
Materials
Three brief scenarios, which were developed 
in previous research (Richardson et al., 2012), 
were used to manipulate hazing severity (see 
Appendix A for the scenarios). Scenario 
development occurred over three stages; first, 
fraternity and sorority members at a large 
Southwestern university were tasked with listing 
hazing acts they had heard about or witnessed, 
and asked to rate those acts as “not severe,” 
“moderately severe,” or “most severe.” Next, 
the researchers selected three hazing scenarios, 
one from each category. Finally, the Greek-life 
advisor and an advisor for a local sorority at 
the same university vetted these scenarios by 
ranking them from least to most severe. Their 
rankings corresponded with the researchers’ 
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initial rankings. In each scenario, participants 
were asked to imagine witnessing the hazing 
event being described. The low severity 
condition involved a situation in which a group 
of fraternity/sorority members were having 
dinner at a restaurant. Active members of the 
group instruct the pledges to retrieve napkins 
and water for the group after the restaurant wait 
staff neglects to do so. The moderate severity 
condition addressed an event in which all 
members were required to dress up in business 
attire. At the event, a group of active members 
begin pelting the pledges with water balloons. 
The high severity condition involved an incident 
in which pledges were required to drink large 
quantities of alcohol. After they have become 
intoxicated, the pledges were then instructed to 
engage in physical exercise (e.g., lunges, running 
in place, etc.) that leads many of them to become 
physically ill. The scenarios were exactly the 
same for fraternity and sorority members, with 
one exception: the word “sorority” was used in 
place of the word “fraternity.”
Measures
Variables related to responses to hazing were 
rated on a five-point scale while those related 
to organizational identification were rated on 
a seven-point scale. Scales were anchored with 
strongly disagree to strongly agree.
Responses to hazing. We created three measures 
for this study to evaluate participants’ responses 
to the hazing scenario. Three items were used to 
evaluate participants’ likelihood of participating 
in the hazing event described in the scenario. 
Participants were asked to rate their agreement 
that they “would consider participating in this 
activity,” could see myself participating in this 
type of activity,” and “would never participate in 
an activity like this” (reverse scored). The mean of 
these items was computed to form the measure 
of willingness to participate in the hazing event 
(M = 2.31, SD = 1.14, α = .88).
We utilized three items to measure 
participants’ intervention efforts. Participants 
rated their agreement that they would “try to 
put a stop to this activity,” “step in to put a stop 
to this type of activity,” and “allow this activity 
to continue” (reverse scored). The mean was 
computed to create the measure of motivation 
to stop the hazing event (M = 3.26, SD = 1.15, 
α = .92).
Finally, we used three items to evaluate 
participants’ intentions to engage in 
whistleblowing. Participants rated their 
agreement that they would “report the hazing 
incident to someone who could affect action,” 
“tell someone in power this occurred in order 
to put an end to it” and “not report the hazing 
incident to someone who could affect action” 
(reverse scored). The mean of these three items 
was computed to create the intention to whistle-
blow measure (M = 2.90, SD = 1.16, α = .85).
Organizational identification. Mael and 
Ashforth’s (1992) six-item measure of 
organizational identification was used to evaluate 
participants’ identification with their fraternity 
or sorority. Sample items include: “When 
someone criticizes my fraternity [sorority], it 
feels like a personal insult” and “When I talk 
about this fraternity [sorority], I usually say ‘we’ 
rather than ‘they.’” Items were rated on a seven-
point scale with larger values indicating a greater 
level of identification. The mean was computed 
for these six items (M = 5.69, SD = 1.14, α = 
.86).
Manipulation check. We included a single-item 
measure to help evaluate the severity of the 
hazing scenario. Participants rated the degree 
to which they felt that the actions described 
in the scenario could have been harmful for 
pledges (M = 3.35, SD = 1.31). We expected the 
respondents would rate severity of the hazing 
scenarios in a manner consistent with the way 
they were devised, e.g. they would rate the low 
severity scenario lower than the other two. 
Control variables. We used three control variables 
in the analyses to account for their influence and 
ensure that the results were not an artifact of 
these factors. Given potential differences in the 
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cultures of the social organizations between the 
two universities, the university at which data 
were collected was included as a control variable 
in the analyses. Additionally, participants’ sex 
was included as a control variable to account for 
differences stemming from whether participants 
were members of a fraternity or sorority. Finally, 
participants’ length of membership in their 
fraternity or sorority was evaluated to account 
for any possible differences stemming from the 
amount of time participants had been a member 
of their fraternity or sorority. Descriptive 




We used confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) 
to evaluate the measures of identification and 
responses to hazing. The items for willingness to 
participate, motivation to stop, and intentions 
to whistle-blow were evaluated in a three-factor 
model. The alternate fit indices demonstrate that 
this model adequately fit the sample data, χ2(df 
= 24) = 220.09, p < .01, CFI = .94, SRMR 
= .08. The model involving the measure of 
identification, χ2(df = 9) = 35.65, p < .01, CFI 
= .97, SRMR = .04, also fit the sample data.
We conducted a check to determine the 
efficacy of the hazing severity manipulation. The 
one-way ANOVA was statistically significant, 
F (2, 238) = 50.01, p < .01, η2 = .33. Post-
hoc pair-wise comparisons showed that the 
low severity (M = 2.43, SD = 1.10, n = 79), 
moderate severity (M = 3.32, SD = 1.25, n = 
82), and high severity conditions (M = 4.28, 
SD = 0.86, n = 80) were all perceived to be 
significantly different from one another. The 
results indicate that the severity manipulation 
was effective.
Hazing Severity and Organizational 
Identification
Hypotheses 1 and 2 predicted that hazing 
severity and organizational identification were 
associated with (a) willingness to participate, 
(b) motivation to stop, and (c) intention to 
whistle-blow. Hypothesis 3 predicted that 
hazing severity moderated the relationship 
between organizational identification and the 
three outcome variables. Because organizational 
identification was a continuous variable, OLS 
regression was used to test the hypotheses. 
Prior to conducting the analyses, we created two 
dummy-coded variables to evaluate the three 
hazing severity conditions. The low severity 
condition was used as the reference group; thus, 
positive relationships between the two dummy-
coded variables and other variables indicated 
that scores were greater in the moderate or high 
severity conditions.
We constructed three identical regression 
models, with the exception of the outcome 
variable, to test the hypotheses. The three control 
variables were entered in the first block. The two 
dummy-coded variables representing hazing 
severity were included in the second block, 
and the measure of organizational identification 
was entered in the third block. The interactions 
between identification and the two dummy-
coded variables were included in the fourth 
block. The variables in blocks two and three 
were mean-centered prior to constructing the 
interaction terms (Aiken & West, 1991).
The results, which are reported in Table 
1, are mostly consistent with Hypotheses 1a 
and 1c. The change in variance associated with 
adding the second block to the model served as 
the test of the main effect for severity (Aiken & 
West, 1991). Adding the second block resulted 
in a statistically significant increase in variance 
explained for motivation to whistle-blow, ΔF (2, 
230) = 4.19, p = .02, ΔR2 = .03. The p-value 
associated with the change in variance explained 
for willingness to participate approached the 
traditional criterion for statistical significance, 
ΔF (2, 230) = 2.98, p = .053, ΔR2 = .02. The 
beta coefficients for the dummy-coded variables 
were both statistically significant, indicating that 
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Willingness to participate Motivation to stop Intention to whistle-blow
β β β β β β β β β β β β
Block 1: Control 
variables
Participant 
sex (0 = 
male)
-.28* -.28* -.28* -.30* .22* .22* .23* .24* .26* .26* .27* .29*
University (0 
= Withheld)
.18* .17* .19* .19* -.21* -.20* -.22* -.21* -.27* -.26* -.28* -.28
Length of 
membership




-.16* -.16* -.14* .12 .12 .11 .18* .18* .16*
High severity 
(dummy)
-.15* -.14* -.14* .07 .07 .06 .18* .18* .18*
Block 3: 
Identification












ΔR2 .11* .02 .003 .04* .08 .01 .002 .04* .12* .03* .002 .04*
R2 .11* .13* .13* .18* .08* .09* .09* .13* .12* .15* .15* .19*
* p < .05. Note. Mod. severity = Moderate severity. The variables Moderate severity and High severity were dummy coded so that the reference 
group consisted of the low severity condition; a positive beta coefficient for either of these variables indicates that scores for the outcome 
variable were larger among participants in the moderate or high severity conditions than participants in the low severity condition. VIF scores 
for individual predictor variables ranged from 1.002 to 2.664. 
Table 1
Results of the Regression Models Examining Hazing Severity and Organizational Identification as Predictors of Member 
Responses 
willingness to participate was significantly lower 
and motivation to whistle-blow was significantly 
higher in the medium and high severity 
conditions than the low severity condition. 
Hypothesis 1b was not supported; there were no 
differences in intentions to stop the hazing across 
the three levels of severity. Hypotheses 2a, 2b, 
and 2c also were not supported. Organizational 
identification was not associated with any of the 
three outcome variables.
The tests of the interaction term showed 
statistically significant interaction effects that 
were largely consistent with Hypotheses 3a, 
3b, and 3c. The change in variance explained 
by adding the fourth block containing the 
interaction terms functioned as the test of 
significance for the interaction between hazing 
severity and organizational identification (Aiken 
& West, 1991). As can be seen in Table 1, adding 
the fourth block resulted in a statistically 
significant increase in variance explained for 
willingness to participate, ΔF (2, 227) = 5.67, p 
< .01, ΔR2 = .04, intention to stop, ΔF (2, 226) 
= 5.09, p = .01, ΔR2 = .04, and motivation to 
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whistle-blow, ΔF (2, 227) = 5.62, p < .01, ΔR2 
= .04. Finally, we should note that we evaluated 
the variance inflation factor (VIF) scores for all 
of the preceding models and the results offer 
evidence that multicollinearity among the 
predictor variables was not a problem. The range 
of VIF scores can be found in the note for Table 1.
The PROCESS macro for SPSS (Hayes, 2013) 
was used to decompose the significant interaction 
between organizational identification and the 
dummy coded variables for all three dependent 
measures. The results, which are illustrated in 
Figures 1 through 3, consistently show statistically 
significant associations between organizational 
identification and the three outcomes when 
hazing severity was low. The unstandardized beta 
coefficients indicate that, when the severity of 
the hazing event was low, participants who were 
Figure 1
Organizational Identification Moderates the Relationship between Severity of Hazing Incident and Willingness to Participate in Hazing 
Figure 2
Organizational Identification Moderates the Relationship between Severity of Hazing Incident and Intention to Engage in Whistleblowing 
Figure 3
Organizational Identification Moderates the Relationship between Severity of Hazing Incident and Motivation to Intervene 
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more identified with their fraternity or sorority 
were less motivated to intervene, less likely 
to whistle blow, and more likely to participate 
in hazing. When the severity of the incident 
was high, organizational identification was not 
associated with any of the three outcomes. These 
two findings were consistent with the predictions 
made in Hypotheses 3a-3c. Although Hypotheses 
3a-c also predicted a significant association 
between identification and the three outcomes 
at moderate levels of severity, the simple slopes 
were not statistically significant when severity 
was moderate.
Discussion
While many studies examine organizational 
members’ responses to wrongdoing, most use 
a whistleblowing/silence dichotomy that may 
not reflect communicative options available 
(Teo & Caspersz, 2011). The purpose of this 
study was to investigate impacts of hazing 
severity and organizational identification levels 
on fraternity/sorority members’ use of several 
response options (participating, intervening, and 
whistleblowing) upon witnessing a hypothetical 
hazing situation. Results of this study indicate 
hazing severity influenced two of the three 
outcomes. As the hazing event became more 
severe, intentions to participate decreased and 
motivation to whistle-blow increased. Moreover, 
hazing severity moderated the relationships 
between organizational identification and 
the three outcomes. When severity was low, 
organizational identification was positively 
associated with willingness to participate and 
negatively associated with intentions to whistle-
blow and motivation to stop the activity. Each of 
these findings will be discussed next.
Hazing Severity, Organizational 
Identification, and Member Responses
Though university policies and state laws are 
established to prevent hazing (Montague et al., 
2008), this behavior persists within fraternities 
and sororities (Owen et al., 2008). Palmer 
(2013) argues that, when members of highly-
cohesive groups see their co-workers behaving 
unethically, they are more likely to participate 
and less likely to dissent against the wrongdoing. 
Our findings support this claim to a point. Hazing 
severity affected willingness to participate and 
whistleblowing intentions such that as severity 
increased, participation intentions decreased 
and whistleblowing intentions increased. These 
results have important implications for efforts 
to end hazing. It is promising that fraternity/
sorority members indicate being less likely to 
participate and more willing to blow the whistle 
against severe hazing, particularly considering 
harsh treatment during hazing can increase 
targets’ dependency upon the group (Keating et 
al., 2005). Our findings suggest this dependency 
may be difficult to attain if fraternity/sorority 
members are indeed more likely to report harsh 
hazing. Moreover, being strongly identified 
with a fraternity or sorority had no impact 
on respondents’ motivation to participate or 
attempt to report the wrongdoing when the 
severity of hazing was moderate or high.
Yet it is also concerning the results revealed 
members who were more identified with their 
fraternity or sorority reported being more 
likely to participate and less likely to intervene 
or whistle-blow when the severity of hazing 
was low. This finding suggests fraternity/
sorority members see some hazing as acceptable, 
and even indicate a willingness to join in its 
practice—when they strongly identify with 
their organization. It is possible that fraternity/
sorority members view low level hazing as a key 
cultural value of their organizations, making it 
difficult for them to see the problematic aspects 
of this behavior (Keating et al., 2005). In Owen 
et al.’s (2008) study, students recognized that 
having pledges run errands for active members 
(similar to our low severity condition) was a 
form of hazing; however, fraternity/sorority 
members in the present study may not see these 
behaviors as harmful, or even hazing, as they 
11
et al.: Joining in, Blowing the Whistle, or Intervening: Examining the Ef
Published by W&M ScholarWorks, 2019
Oracle: The Research Journal of the Association of Fraternity/Sorority Advisors
Vol. 14, Issue 2  •  Winter 2019
31
indicated the highest level of participation for 
this scenario. 
The lack of change in respondents’ intentions 
to intervene across the severity conditions 
represents another problematic result. While it is 
admirable that fraternity/sorority members will 
increasingly whistle-blow as severity progresses, 
it is important to remember that whistleblowing 
is a process that takes time (Henik, 2008). 
Whistle-blowers must identify the proper target 
and channel for reporting wrongdoing, and 
deliberation over these factors takes time. It is 
only through intervention that hazing can be 
stopped in the moment. However, based upon 
this study’s results, victims are at risk of harm 
if fraternity/sorority members are not willing 
to intervene in the moment to end hazing. 
Additionally, it is worth noting that, by itself, 
organizational identification did not predict 
any of the three responses to wrongdoing. 
When considering the question of whether 
organizational identification influences responses 
to unethical behavior, it appears the answer is 
“it depends” on the wrongdoing’s severity. This 
was particularly true when severity was low. 
In this condition, a high level of organizational 
identification fostered participation, and served 
to undermine attempts to whistle-blow and 
intervene. However, these trends did not extend 
to the moderate and high severity conditions, 
supporting Jones’ (1991) notion of moral 
intensity. Jones asserts that as an event becomes 
increasingly likely to cause harm, particularly in 
a direct and immediate manner, individuals are 
more likely to respond in an ethical manner. In 
the present study, when severity was relatively 
great (i.e., more than low), organizational 
identification had no bearing on participation, 
intervention, or whistleblowing. It is possible that 
severe hazing produces an individuation effect 
for observers, freeing them from organizational 
identification bonds and enabling them to act in 
ways true to their individual values (Pearce & 
Giacalone, 2003).
The present study contributes to a line of 
research examining interrelationships between 
organizational wrongdoing, responses, and 
organizational identification. Grube et al. (2010) 
found reporting against unsafe practices is highest 
when both organizational and role identities 
are low. Ploeger and Bisel (2013) found as 
members’ levels of organizational identification 
increases, so too did their propensity to 
defend their organizations’ unethical behavior. 
Such results indicate a downside to fostering 
organizational identification, as organizational 
identification reduced employees’ willingness to 
speak out against unethical behavior. Likewise, 
the present study surfaced similar concerns. 
We found fraternity/sorority members 
indicate an increasing willingness to participate 
in hazing in low severity conditions as their 
organizational identification increased. This 
finding demonstrates the double-edge sword 
that is organizational identification; while, 
it fosters increased intent-to-stay and other 
positive outcomes, it may distort members’ 
abilities to think critically and for themselves 
(Davis & Myers, 2012; Ploeger & Bisel, 2013). 
This is especially important considering the 
high levels of attachment members have to their 
fraternities/sororities (Davis & Myers, 2012; 
Williams & Connaughton, 2012). Fortunately, 
the pattern did not hold true for the more 
severe conditions, suggesting organizational 
identification has its limits when threat of harm 
is close and immediate.
Implications for Practitioners
This study’s results offer several practical 
implications related to fraternities and sororities, 
hazing, and efforts to end it. First, universities, 
fraternities, and sororities, need to do a better 
job educating fraternity/sorority members on 
what is hazing. Scholars have recognized it is 
problematic there is not a common, uniform 
definition of hazing (Ellsworth, 2006; Hollmann, 
2002). Based upon this study’s findings, it is 
apparent that when a target may be injured 
by hazing, fraternity/sorority members are 
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willing to speak out against it. However, they 
do not whistle-blow, and might even participate, 
when hazing is not health threatening. Similarly, 
in their study, Montague et al. (2008) found 
fraternity/sorority members “overwhelmingly 
saw a threshold past which hazing becomes 
inappropriate” (p. 268). Campus administrators 
could utilize on-campus campaigns and 
discussions with influential members/leaders 
to make sure fraternity/sorority members are 
able to readily identify what is hazing by legal 
definitions not by socially-accepted thresholds 
and norms. 
The present study also raises questions about 
how to transform behavioral intent into actual 
behavior, particularly converting intentions to 
report hazing incidents to genuine interventions. 
Research indicates the relationship between 
intent and actual behavior is not as strong and 
direct as previously thought (Webb & Sheeran, 
2006). Scholars argued individuals who engage 
in an implemental phase, in which they plan 
when, where, and how to act, are more likely 
to perform the behavior in question (van Hooft, 
Born, Taris, der Flier, & Blonk, 2005). Thus, if 
university and fraternity/sorority organization 
leaders can foster members engaging in these 
sorts of planning behaviors, they might be able 
to enhance the relationship between intent to 
intervene or whistleblow into actual behaviors. 
Role-playing provides one avenue to encourage 
planning behaviors. Specifically, facilitators could 
develop role-play scenarios depicting fraternity/
sorority members hazing pledges, while 
bystanders observed. The facilitator could ask 
observers: “When would be an appropriate time 
to intervene/blow the whistle?” “Where would 
you go to intervene/blow the whistle?” and 
“How would you intervene/blow the whistle?” 
Then, the observers could act out the behaviors 
they have planned. This sort of training could 
instill appropriate planning behaviors to facilitate 
the intent-action link.   
The study’s finding that low level hazing 
invites participation needs to be addressed by 
practitioners. Research indicates exposure to 
low-level unethical behavior may desensitize 
individuals in ways that allow them to persist 
with more routine and harmful types of 
misconduct (Fida, Tramontano, Paciello, Ghezzi, 
& Barbaranelli, 2018). Case study evidence 
suggests when large numbers of individuals 
participate in relatively harmless unethical 
behavior they create a sense of conformity that 
enables increasingly severe unethical activity 
(Ashforth & Anand, 2003). Roosevelt (2018) 
recommended new member activities be guided 
by goals, or “engaging students on the basis of 
what they hope to accomplish with the activity” 
(p. 27). Thus, university and national fraternity/
sorority leaders might engage in dialogue 
with local chapters about what they hope to 
accomplish with their new member activities. 
With those goals as starting points, the various 
stakeholders could map out the most appropriate 
activities, e.g. team-building, for reaching these 
goals. By including local chapter leaders in these 
conversations, they gain a sense of ownership 
and responsibility in designing new member 
activities that serve constructive purposes, 
rather than seemingly pointless hazing activities 
that serve no apparent agenda (Roosevelt, 2018). 
Finally, we hope this study fosters discussion 
about the myriad ways individuals or small groups 
within hazing fraternities and sororities can 
positively effect change. While whistleblowing 
and direct intervention can reduce hazing, 
these acts may also invite retaliation against 
those who engage them. A more productive, 
long-term strategy involves fraternity/sorority 
members attempting to change the culture 
of their respective organizations. Methods of 
culture change include gaining leadership roles 
that facilitate culture change, creating informal 
coalitions with like-minded members who are 
against hazing, recruiting new members who 
share anti-hazing attitudes, and inviting alumni, 
university administrators, or faculty members to 
social events (Hassan, 2019; Westenfeld, 2019). 
Research should identify successful examples of 
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this sort of culture change so that a set of best 
practices can be initiated. 
 
Limitations and Future Directions
The results of this study must be weighed 
against its limitations. As mentioned above, we 
measured behavioral intentions rather than actual 
behaviors. It is impossible to know whether 
fraternity/sorority members would employ 
these behaviors in real-life situations. Future 
research should identify those who have actually 
witnessed hazing, collect their responses, and 
derive predicting factors from these experiences. 
Next, the present study also failed to account for 
control variables, e.g. campus culture, students’ 
academic standing, or their self-esteem, which 
might influence the results. Future studies could 
take these and additional variables into account 
to test their effect on the relationships between 
organizational identification, harmfulness, 
and behavioral intentions. Another possible 
limitation stems from our use of a convenience 
sample. Self-selection and other forms of bias 
like non-response bias may have been an issue in 
that participants who were more highly identified 
with their organization may have been more 
motivated to participate. Two considerations, 
however, should serve to mitigate such concerns. 
First, all respondents were awarded extra-
credit in exchange for their participation. This 
incentive should have encouraged all eligible 
respondents to complete the study. Second, the 
use of random assignment in the experiment 
should ensure that any existing bias was equally 
distributed across conditions and should not have 
unduly influenced the results. 
Finally, the present study only examined 
organizational identification without failing to 
consider how salient this identification is during 
an occurrence of unethical behavior. Considering 
organizational identification is situational (Scott, 
Corman, & Cheney, 1998), it is possible that acts 
of hazing could either (a) increase organizational 
identification or (b) increase organizational 
disidentification in the moment. However, the 
present study only captured participants’ general 
organizational identification state. Future 
research must determine how hazing affects 
organizational identification in situ, and then 
examine its effects on response behaviors.
Conclusion
The present study sought to continue research 
into responses to organizational wrongdoing, 
severity of wrongdoing, and organizational 
identification. On one hand, the findings are 
promising, suggesting as severity increases, so 
too do whistleblowing intentions. Still, work 
remains to be done in hazing education and 
prevention as evidenced by other findings. 
Indeed, this study is unique in that it identifies 
a condition in which organizational members 
admit they would participate in unethical 
behavior. As long as there is no apparent harm 
to hazing targets, fraternity/sorority members 
appear to be willing to participate. Such findings 
suggest we have a long way to go in preventing 
injuries, psychological trauma, and even death 
attributed to hazing activities.
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Appendix
Description of hazing scenarios.
Scenario 1 (not severe)
A group from your sorority/fraternity goes out to eat one night. One of the actives discovers 
that the waitress neglected to bring her/his table napkins. You witness the active say to one of the 
pledges, “Hey pledge, go get some napkins for my table.” Later, when one of the actives runs out 
of water, you hear an active tell him, “Just send a pledge to get you some.” 
Scenario 2 (moderately severe)
Your sorority/fraternity has an event that requires all members to dress formally. After 
instructing a group of pledges to get dressed for this event, you witness a group of actives 
throwing water balloons at the pledges.
Scenario 3 (most severe)
During a rush event, you witness a group of actives insisting that a group of pledges continue 
to drink heavily. It is evident that the pledges are already intoxicated. After the pledges have 
consumed the alcohol as requested by the actives, the actives ask the pledges to participate in a 
series of physical activities such as jogging in place, doing lunges across the floor, push-ups, and 
jumping-jacks. During this, many of the pledges become ill.
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